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Abstract—Domain Name System (DNS) is based on client-server 
architecture and employed User Packet Diagram (UDP) protocol 
to transport requests and responses. Due to UDP supports 
unreliable connection, malicious users are able to fabricate spoofed 
DNS requests very easily. Such DNS problems in turn affect 
numerous other network services and critical in resource 
utilization. Delay in deploying secure DNS motivates the need for 
local networks to protect DNS infrastructure. DNS reflection 
attack for example takes advantage of the DNS response message 
and results substantially larger than DNS query messages. In this 
work, we propose a distributed defense scheme in DNS 
infrastructure to prevent from reflection attack. Our defense 
scheme aims to prevent spoofed addresses from getting any 
responses by applying a classification-based packet filtering 
strategy.  Specifically, our local DNS server regularly checked DNS 
requests in its database in order to differentiate between legitimate 
and illegitimate requests. We invent validation phase in our 
filtering strategy by getting confirmation before the request stored 
in local side server. The key idea behind this is to ensure the local 
DNS database is merely stored legitimate requests and prevent the 
fake DNS request transferred to users.  Our analysis and the 
corresponding experimental results show that the proposed 
scheme offers an effective defense solution while implicitly 
improving network communication traffic. 
 





From its creation over 30 years ago, Domain Name Service 
(DNS) has been successfully maturing to become the essential 
part of the Internet today. It is an important part of Internet 
infrastructure that translates domain names into Internet 
Protocol (IP) addresses and vice versa [1]. The inaccessibility 
of the naming service causes big impairment in the Internet and 
might leads to catastrophic results [2-6]. The significance of 
DNS in Internet services made it very (if not the most) 
fascinating target for malware criminals and hackers. It is 
because when the DNS server fails, the domain that it serves 
also went inaccessible that makes the probability of wide-scale 
disturbance.  
Nowadays, the security community put the DNS protocol 
under their consideration because of the security shortcomings, 
cracks, and defects found in it in the last few years. On the 
Internet, the reflection-based attacks is the most familiar and 
nastiest one, which very expensive and high performance 
hardware and equipment required to counter on it [3]. In such 
attack scenario, the attacker forges a datagram with victim's IP 
address as the source address. The datagram then is sent to DNS 
server, amplifies it and sends it back to the victim, which brings 
about uninvited traffic. Due to UDP datagrams are 
connectionless scheme, it is very easy the attacker to destruct 
the IP address. Recently, attackers launched outbreaks with 
hundreds of Gb/s bandwidth of fake addresses and make the 
network traffic in heavy congestion [7]. When the attacker 
conquered the local DNS server it then become a reflection 
server; hence, users/victims cannot allocate their self into the 
absolute server. The main role of defense systems is to 
accurately detect such attacks and quickly respond to stop the 
illegal incoming requests. It is significant to recognize the 
legitimate traffic and differentiate it from attackers in order to 
avoid them for sharing the same communication traffic. 
Unfortunately, it is hard to trace such differentiation at a traffic 
attacker’s structure. The factor clearly indicate that the DDoS 
problem required a distributed cooperative solution [4, 5, 8, 9]. 
Specifically, the traffic detection mechanism is needed at near 
to the users/victims. Meanwhile, the process of responsive and 
division of communication traffic between legitimate users and 
attackers is applied at the source communication channel. In 
addition, the communication traffic from either legitimate users 
or attackers can be achieved by enlisting the help of backbone 
routers for controlling the attack traffic. 
In this paper, we propose classification-based mechanism for 
detecting spoofed addresses and preventing from getting any 
responses from the local server. Such processes are applied in 
both authoritative and recursive DNS servers. Our defense 
mechanism able to accurately distinguish between legitimate 
DNS packets and the fake ones. It also implicitly helps to 
increase system reliability in communication network.  This 
paper organizes as follows. Section 2 introduced an overview 
of Domain Name Service from security perspective. In Section 
3, we discussed about DNS reflection attack. Section 4 
described our defense mechanism. Experiment and results are 
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II. OVERVIEW OF DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM (DNS) FROM 
SECURITY PERSPECTIVE 
 
The name of communication servers can be divided into two 
main categories are authoritative and recursive (resolver) 
servers.  The authorization server provides response (answer) 
to request queries that based on communication protocol in the 
system configuration. Meanwhile, the recursive (resolver) 
server forwarded a query that does not have any match from its 
record to the higher level of servers in the DNS hierarchy 
system. It aims to find the answer for the query. In some cases, 
if the answer is not found means that there is no matching in 
DNS record, and then it will be directed to the DNS root server 
that represent as ”.”, the top of the DNS hierarch. 
DNS is a client-server service based system. It employs a 
constitution of a distributed database that takes advantage of a 
hierarchical tree structure to organize the domain name space 
into zones [10]. For each zone, the authoritative name server 
(ANS) responses for each incoming request that gets help from 
DNS Resource Record (RR). Each RR outlines the zone 
resources to its analogous domain name. RR is dispatched the 
queries to a predefined recursive name server (RNS) when there 
is an application on a given host needs the Internet Protocol (IP) 
address of a domain. The RNS then traverses the DNS hierarchy 
and try to find and match the appropriate answer. Moreover, for 
memory performance reasons, the RNS maintains a cache 
memory of RR for storing the current received query. It also 
aims to minimize searching time of subsequent similar requests 
that arrived from other users. 
 
 
Figure 1: Domain Name Structure 
 
An open DNS resolver server is another component in DNS 
system. It role is to resolve the recursive queries for both local 
and non-local users [11]. The open resolver servers are a 
necessary element in DNS amplification attacks. Usually, DNS 
servers should reject queries that arrived from anonymous 
networks. It only answers to those queries that originate from 
the trusted networks. In some circumstances, it may force some 
hosts or companies to make their DNS server become as open 
DNS resolver. It aims to serve their employees and clients that 
are traveling around the world and need trusted DNS servers. 
However, the DNS open resolvers answer all incoming DNS 
queries. There are many public DNS open resolvers such as 
OPENDNS (208.67.222.222 or 208.67.220.220) and Google’s 
DNS (8.8.8.8). According to Open Resolver Project in Cisco 
Systems [12], since October 2013 there exist about 28 million 
operating open DNS resolvers in the world have facing with 
risky and great threats. Therefore, in order to avoid 
mishandlings, most of the known public DNS servers have 
equipped with some security features and very strong DNS 
policy. 
Botnets are prevailing mechanisms for the facilitation of the 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on computer 
networks or applications [8, 13]. Botnets consist of networked 
collections of compromised machines called robots or ‘bots’ for 
short that is controlled by nodes called ‘Botmasters’ or 
‘Botherders’. 
In DNS reflection/amplification attacks, botnets query DNS 
open resolvers with spoofed requests and return much larger 
DNS responses to the victim (the spoofed IP address) [13]. 
Botnets are networks that promoted the distributed denial of 
service (DDoS) attacks on computer networks or applications. 
The high amplification factor will be achieved by the attacker 
when DNS server answers "ANY" requests. It is because 
"ANY" request returns all records of the entire name server that 
recognized in the RR. The network firewall can be used to block 
all "ANY" requests, unfortunately it also will probably be 
blocked the legitimate traffic as well. There are other some 
services that normally used by the attackers such as “RRSIG", 
“DNSKEY" and “TXT"(Abbasi, 2014) to cause large 
amplification. There are few filtering mechanisms in DNS that 
able to provide a complete separation and identification of 
legitimate and fraud requests. This leads to bogus traffic that 
flooded in the communication path between the attack and users 
(Douglas C. MacFarland, Craig A. Shue, 2015).There is also 
lack of defense mechanism that able to help the users/victims 
during communication attack [6]. Therefore, DNS queries (i.e., 
request and response) needed reliable mechanism to prevent 
their queries from misleading by illegal request or attackers.  
 
III. DNS-REFLECTION ATTACK 
 
DNS reflection is a method used to perform Distributed 
Denial of Service or commonly called as DDoS attack. This 
method used DNS server as its base to slow down the 
communication network infrastructure and resources [8]. In 
such attack, the attacker sent DNS request to the DNS resolver 
server that consist the spoofed address as the target’s address. 
The attackers then submit as many requests as possible to 
maximize the amplification effect.  There are three main 
attributes in order to identify DNS amplification attack [3, 6]. 
First, the DNS amplification attack used port 53 and UDP 
protocol. Second, there is large volume of UDP packets that 
passed through the communication channel within short time 
period. The last characteristic of DNS amplification attack is 
that incoming and outgoing ports are do not match to each 
other’s.  
In order to launch the DNS reflection/amplification attack, 
the attacker must accomplish two procedures [6]. Firstly, the 
attacker must spoof the victim's IP address. Through this tactic, 
the attacker achieved the traffic reflection that cause all the 
responses from the DNS server then be directed to the victim’s 
server. Second procedure is the attacker creates the responses 
that are several times larger than the request. The authors in [7] 
proposed the defense mechanism to reduce the amplification 
factor by lowering the amplification factor. This is achieved by 
increasing requests’ sizes and disabling response to some 
records, (i.e., “ANY” record). The advantage of this mechanism 
is it can save the communication channel’s bandwidth when the 
attack occurs. The drawback of such mechanism is it will be 
enlarged the communication traffic on the network at most of 
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the times. The authors in [9] proposed the defense method by 
storing information of every outgoing DNS packets in DNS 
Resource Record (RR) in order to distinguish between 
legitimate and fake packets to counter DNS reflection. Their 
defense method checked every incoming response in the DNS 
RR and only be accepted if the response existed in the record. 
Otherwise, it considered as suspicious and the response then be 
discarded. However, it is does not concerned on protecting the 
traffic from flooding by the attackers’ responses. The response 
rate limiting (RRL) is defense method that proposed in [14] to 
mitigate DNS reflection attacks. RRL reduced the reflection 
attack rate by warning the authoritative servers of the high 
volumes of malicious queries. However, it is only applicable for 
authoritative name servers where it might decrease the server 
performance when the attacks get more sophisticated and 
dynamic. 
When the flooding attack is detected, the computing system 
will be disconnected the victim from the network and manually 
fix the problem. All of the flooding attacks waste many 
resources (e.g., processing time, space, etc.). Hence, the critical 
goal of defense mechanism is to dynamically detect the attacks 
as soon as possible and stop/block them as near as possible to 
their sources. The first criterion for classification is the location 
where the defense mechanism implemented. There are two 
main types of defense mechanisms are centralized and hybrid 
[8]. In the centralized defense mechanism, the detection and 
response is mostly control centrally either by each of network 
deployment points (e.g., source-based mechanisms) or by some 
responsible points within the group of deployment points (e.g., 
network-based mechanisms). As opposed to centralized defense 
mechanisms, hybrid defense mechanisms are deployed at (or 
their components are distributed over) multiple locations such 
as source, destination or intermediate networks and there is 
usually some cooperation agreement among the network 
deployment points [4]. The advantage of such defense 
mechanism is more robust against flood attacks. Due to there 
are more resources at various levels (e.g., destination, source, 
and network), the authorization and authentication easy to 
monitor and implement. However, it might be increased the 
processing complexity and overhead because of the cooperation 
and communication among distributed components scattered all 
over the Internet. The hybrid defense mechanism also needs 
trusted communication among various distributed components 
in order to cooperate/collaborate in dynamic networks. Our 
defense mechanism in this work is explicitly taking into account 
distributed computing environment while classifying the DNS 
requests of legitimate and fake requests. 
 
IV. DEFENSE MECHANISMS TOWARDS DNS REFLECTION 
ATTACK 
 
In this work, the defense mechanism proposed by applying a 
classification-based packet filtering strategy. It aims to prevent 
DNS reflection/amplification attack to be flooded into the 
communication network. In this work, we used two type of 
additional packets are validation and confirmation packets. We 
distinguished DNS requests between legitimate and fake 
requests and drop the fake request queries before it can 
congest/harm the communication path towards the 
users/victims. Specifically, every new request from the 
recognized domain is be given validation packet before its 
detail is stored in the DNS RR at LRS. After the packet’s detail 
kept at the LRS, the ANS forwarded the confirmation packet to 
acknowledge the sender authenticates by the domain server 
already. Our validation and confirmation packets are created 
per request basis. That means the request must be has same 
information for every incoming and outgoing processes. It able 
to eliminate the fake DNS request stores in the system because 
the DNS amplification attack always change its information. 
Our classified-based defense mechanism consists of Local 
Recursive Server (LRS), Authoritative Name Servers (ANS) 
and several processing machines that used by network end users 




Figure 2: System Model 
 
Every component in the system is running as virtual 
machines. We used VMware Workstation 12.0 X64 for 
designing the computing system. For both authoritative name 
server (ANS) and local recursive server (LRS) we utilized 
Debian 8.0 32-bit. Meanwhile, the user machine works on 
Microsoft Windows 7 32-bit, and Kali Linux 1.1.c acts as the 
attacker that starts the bot to attack the system. Attackers send 
spoofed, fake requests to Authoritative Name servers (ANS) 
using DNS flooder 1.1. Information about DNS request, 
validation request, validation response, and DNS response 
query are stored in My SQL tables within both LRS and ANS. 
Moreover, all the communication traffic requests/responses are 
stored using packet capturing and analyzing tool. In this work, 
we used IPtraf as the capturing tool.   
The attacks formulated and commenced when ANS receives 
a large number of requests from attackers. The entire requests’ 
sources IP addresses spoofed, where ANS then replicates them 
to the user/victim through the LRS. The communication path to 
the LRS is flooded with bogus traffic after the attack reflected 
by the ANS. At the endpoint, the Denial of Service received by 
the user/victim due to unknown DNS response that can be 
matched in the record at LRS. 
The attackers’ data is created by using DNS Flooder 1.1. The 
program is written in C language that developed by PLXSert 
[15]. PLXSert has observed the release and deployment of new 
DNS reflection tool. It contains new popular method of 
constructing large DNS resource records; i.e., contains until 
more than 4,000 bytes of responses, especially when the DNS 
queries with an "ANY" requests from the spoofed IP addresses. 
The responses to these "ANY" requests resulted in amplified 
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attack payload which may reach until 50 times larger of the size 
of requesting query [15].  
Our classification-based defense mechanism will be verified 
the request packets within two approval stages. Specifically, 
when the user machine requests a particular website that its 
address is not in the cache records,  the Local Recursive Server 
(LRS) updates the record with the new request packet (i.e., the 
information are Source IP, Destination IP, Source port, 
Destination port). It then forwards the information to the 
Authoritative Name Server (ANS). The ANS sends a validation 
request to the source of the request packet. If the packet is from 
the legitimate source, then the LRS checks for validation packet 
of the corresponding request. It then sends back the 
confirmation packet and informs the ANS about the request 
packet (i.e., legitimate request). However, if there is no 
validation packet, LRS sent a false response to ANS. When 
ANS received the false response from LRS, it drops the request 
and all other requests that acts like that one. 
Due to the size of the response is considerably larger than the 
request; the attacker increased the amount of traffic that 
connected directly to the victim. In this work, we used two key 
issues for measuring severity of the attack. It based on 
amplification factor and attack ability. The amplification factor 
is the ratio between the traffic volume of response and request 
packets that implicitly represent the resource cost ratio between 








Meanwhile, the attack ability is the absolute amount of traffic 
that launched by attacker to the victim; used in [12][13]. We 
used these key issues in order to study accuracy of our 
classification-based defense mechanism. 
 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
In our experiment setting, the ANS database contains both 
DNS requests (i.e., legitimate/real and spoofed requests). The 
sample size used in the experiment is 10000 requests. 
Meanwhile, in the LRS database contains 100 legitimate/real 
requests. The response size is given as summation of 
authentication request and response. It used to calculate 
amplification factor in our study. Both ANS and LRS run on 
Debian Jessie 8.0. Our sample user machine runs on Microsoft 
Window 7 Home Premium while the attacker machine using 
Kali Linux 1.1c. 
We first study on how the performance of our classification-
based defense mechanism (so-called CBD) influenced by a 
percentage of true-positive ratios of packets. Such ratios 
represent in four different ways as follows:   
 
True positive  = spoofed packet that detects as spoofed 
True negative = real packet that detects as real 
False positive = spoofed packets that detects as real 
False negative = real packets that detects as spoofed 
 
We measured accuracy of our mechanism based on the 




× 100 (2) 
 
where β refers to number of spoofed packet and  γ is number of 
packet arrives in the system, respectively. The CBD shows 





Figure 3: Accuracy in True-Positive Scenarios 
 
The pattern of accuracy in CBD (Figure 3) significantly 
differs compared to Prior (i.e., without confirmation status 
from LRS). There is a tendency of reliability growth towards 
variability on the communication links when there is verifying 
procedure applied.  
We then measured the effectiveness of CBD for protecting 
the bandwidth from flooded by bogus traffic. It is indicate as 
below: 
 





where Sattack is the size of incoming packet,  SDDS is the size of 
authentication packets, Y refers to the number of spoofed 
packets that went through the communication channel and Z 
represents  the number of validation and confirmation packets 
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The effectiveness of CBD in gaining better performance 
presented in Figure 4. Interestingly, the classification method 
enables more packets to be accurately checked in the network 
especially during flooded attack. In addition, apparently there 
is huge number of packet not being detected by Prior that 




The domain name can be maliciously used as DNS 
reflection/amplification attacks. Such attacks flooded the users' 
machines with large number of incoming DNS responses, then 
paralyze it. In this work, we presented a distributed defense 
scheme that aims to effectively detect the DNS reflection 
occurrence. Specifically, our defense scheme detected the 
spoofed responses through high amplification factor before they 
can reach the users’ machines. Our detection strategy developed 
based on classification-based filtering mechanism that 
implicitly leads to improve the system accuracy. By filtering 
and discarding the spoofed responses, our defense scheme 
allows only the legitimate requests to get a (right) response. Our 
experimental results confirm that the detection strategy through 
distributed mechanism helps to increase system reliability in 
communication network. In near future, we aim to analyze 
communication complexity when the classification-based 
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